[app-emulation/qemu] bump to include cve fixes, remove vgabios stuff from it, pin seabios to in-overlay version so we don't clash with tree

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.0.0-CVE-2013-4541.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2014 19:52:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load
+
+CVE-2013-4541
+
+s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
+size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
+this to load arbitrary data.
+
+setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
+they are not negative.
+
+Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/bus.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/bus.c b/hw/usb/bus.c
+index fe70429..e48b19f 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/bus.c
++++ b/hw/usb/bus.c
+@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ static int usb_device_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
+     } else {
+         dev->attached = 1;
+     }
+-    if (dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) ||
++    if (dev->setup_index < 0 ||
++        dev->setup_len < 0 ||
++        dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) ||
+         dev->setup_len >= sizeof(dev->data_buf)) {
+         return -EINVAL;
+     }
+-- 
+1.9.3
+