[app-emulation/qemu] version bump, remove old, 2.2 release is around the corner

This commit is contained in:
2014-12-05 04:32:32 +01:00
parent 91ca22bba5
commit 5c78f87585
5 changed files with 1 additions and 738 deletions

View File

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
fix already in upstream
From f17f4989fa193fa8279474c5462289a3cfe69aea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 09:40:25 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] linux-user: fix readlink handling with magic exe symlink
The current code always returns the length of the path when it should
be returning the number of bytes it wrote to the output string.
Further, readlink is not supposed to append a NUL byte, but the current
snprintf logic will always do just that.
Even further, if you pass in a length of 0, you're suppoesd to get back
an error (EINVAL), but the current logic just returns 0.
Further still, if there was an error reading the symlink, we should not
go ahead and try to read the target buffer as it is garbage.
Simple test for the first two issues:
$ cat test.c
int main() {
char buf[50];
size_t len;
for (len = 0; len < 10; ++len) {
memset(buf, '!', sizeof(buf));
ssize_t ret = readlink("/proc/self/exe", buf, len);
buf[20] = '\0';
printf("readlink(/proc/self/exe, {%s}, %zu) = %zi\n", buf, len, ret);
}
return 0;
}
Now compare the output of the native:
$ gcc test.c -o /tmp/x
$ /tmp/x
$ strace /tmp/x
With what qemu does:
$ armv7a-cros-linux-gnueabi-gcc test.c -o /tmp/x -static
$ qemu-arm /tmp/x
$ qemu-arm -strace /tmp/x
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
---
linux-user/syscall.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c
index fccf9f0..7c108ab 100644
--- a/linux-user/syscall.c
+++ b/linux-user/syscall.c
@@ -6636,11 +6636,22 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg2, arg3, 0);
if (!p || !p2) {
ret = -TARGET_EFAULT;
+ } else if (!arg3) {
+ /* Short circuit this for the magic exe check. */
+ ret = -TARGET_EINVAL;
} else if (is_proc_myself((const char *)p, "exe")) {
char real[PATH_MAX], *temp;
temp = realpath(exec_path, real);
- ret = temp == NULL ? get_errno(-1) : strlen(real) ;
- snprintf((char *)p2, arg3, "%s", real);
+ /* Return value is # of bytes that we wrote to the buffer. */
+ if (temp == NULL) {
+ ret = get_errno(-1);
+ } else {
+ /* Don't worry about sign mismatch as earlier mapping
+ * logic would have thrown a bad address error. */
+ ret = MIN(strlen(real), arg3);
+ /* We cannot NUL terminate the string. */
+ memcpy(p2, real, ret);
+ }
} else {
ret = get_errno(readlink(path(p), p2, arg3));
}
--
2.0.0

View File

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
https://bugs.gentoo.org/527088
From e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 12:41:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] vnc: sanitize bits_per_pixel from the client
bits_per_pixel that are less than 8 could result in accessing
non-initialized buffers later in the code due to the expectation
that bytes_per_pixel value that is used to initialize these buffers is
never zero.
To fix this check that bits_per_pixel from the client is one of the
values that the rfb protocol specification allows.
This is CVE-2014-7815.
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
[ kraxel: apply codestyle fix ]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
ui/vnc.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 0fe6eff..8bca597 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -2026,6 +2026,16 @@ static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
return;
}
+ switch (bits_per_pixel) {
+ case 8:
+ case 16:
+ case 32:
+ break;
+ default:
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return;
+ }
+
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
--
2.1.2