[app-emulation/qemu] sync with tree

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7421.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+Vmware Paravirtual SCSI emulator while processing IO requests
+could run into an infinite loop if 'pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr'
+always returned positive value. Limit IO loop to the ring size.
+
+Cc: address@hidden
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+Message-Id: <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
+index babac5a..a5ce7de 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
+@@ -247,8 +247,11 @@ static hwaddr
+ pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
+ {
+     uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
++    uint32_t ring_size = PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_PAGES_REQ_RING
++                            * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
+ 
+-    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
++    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr
++        && ready_ptr - mgr->consumed_ptr < ring_size) {
+         uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
+             mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
+         uint32_t next_ready_page =
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7422.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+virtio back end uses set of buffers to facilitate I/O operations.
+If its size is too large, 'cpu_physical_memory_map' could return
+a null address. This would result in a null dereference
+while un-mapping descriptors. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/virtio/virtio.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+index 15ee3a7..0a4c5b6 100644
+--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
++++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+@@ -472,12 +472,14 @@ static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iove
+         }
+ 
+         iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
+-        iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
+-        addr[num_sg] = pa;
++        if (iov[num_sg].iov_base) {
++            iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
++            addr[num_sg] = pa;
+ 
++            pa += len;
++            num_sg++;
++        }
+         sz -= len;
+-        pa += len;
+-        num_sg++;
+     }
+     *p_num_sg = num_sg;
+ }
+-- 
+2.5.5

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7423.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+When processing IO request in mptsas, it uses g_new to allocate
+a 'req' object. If an error occurs before 'req->sreq' is
+allocated, It could lead to an OOB write in mptsas_free_request
+function. Use g_new0 to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+Message-Id: <address@hidden>
+Cc: address@hidden
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/scsi/mptsas.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
+index 0e0a22f..eaae1bb 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
+@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
+         goto bad;
+     }
+ 
+-    req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
++    req = g_new0(MPTSASRequest, 1);
+     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
+     req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
+     req->dev = s;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7466.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+If the xhci uses msix, it doesn't free the corresponding
+memory, thus leading a memory leak. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+index 188f954..281a2a5 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+@@ -3709,8 +3709,7 @@ static void usb_xhci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
+     /* destroy msix memory region */
+     if (dev->msix_table && dev->msix_pba
+         && dev->msix_entry_used) {
+-        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_table_mmio);
+-        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_pba_mmio);
++        msix_uninit(dev, &xhci->mem, &xhci->mem);
+     }
+ 
+     usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7907.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+i.MX Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
+data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
+packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
+descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
+Set an upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/net/imx_fec.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+Update per
+  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg05284.html
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/imx_fec.c b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
+index 1c415ab..1d74827 100644
+--- a/hw/net/imx_fec.c
++++ b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
+@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_imx_eth = {
+ #define PHY_INT_PARFAULT            (1 << 2)
+ #define PHY_INT_AUTONEG_PAGE        (1 << 1)
+ 
++#define IMX_MAX_DESC                1024
++
+ static void imx_eth_update(IMXFECState *s);
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -402,12 +404,12 @@ static void imx_eth_update(IMXFECState *s)
+ 
+ static void imx_fec_do_tx(IMXFECState *s)
+ {
+-    int frame_size = 0;
++    int frame_size = 0, descnt = 0;
+     uint8_t frame[ENET_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
+     uint8_t *ptr = frame;
+     uint32_t addr = s->tx_descriptor;
+ 
+-    while (1) {
++    while (descnt++ < IMX_MAX_DESC) {
+         IMXFECBufDesc bd;
+         int len;
+ 

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7908.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 070c4b92b8cd5390889716677a0b92444d6e087a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 16:02:37 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: limit buffer descriptor count
+
+ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
+data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
+packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
+descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
+Set upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/net/mcf_fec.c |    5 +++--
+ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+index 0ee8ad9..d31fea1 100644
+--- a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
++++ b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ do { printf("mcf_fec: " fmt , ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+ #define DPRINTF(fmt, ...) do {} while(0)
+ #endif
+ 
++#define FEC_MAX_DESC 1024
+ #define FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE 2032
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
+     uint32_t addr;
+     mcf_fec_bd bd;
+     int frame_size;
+-    int len;
++    int len, descnt = 0;
+     uint8_t frame[FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
+     uint8_t *ptr;
+ 
+@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
+     ptr = frame;
+     frame_size = 0;
+     addr = s->tx_descriptor;
+-    while (1) {
++    while (descnt++ < FEC_MAX_DESC) {
+         mcf_fec_read_bd(&bd, addr);
+         DPRINTF("tx_bd %x flags %04x len %d data %08x\n",
+                 addr, bd.flags, bd.length, bd.data);
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7909.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+The AMD PC-Net II emulator has set of control and status(CSR)
+registers. Of these, CSR76 and CSR78 hold receive and transmit
+descriptor ring length respectively. This ring length could range
+from 1 to 65535. Setting ring length to zero leads to an infinite
+loop in pcnet_rdra_addr. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/net/pcnet.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+index 198a01f..3078de8 100644
+--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
++++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+@@ -1429,8 +1429,11 @@ static void pcnet_csr_writew(PCNetState *s, uint32_t rap, uint32_t new_value)
+     case 47: /* POLLINT */
+     case 72:
+     case 74:
++        break;
+     case 76: /* RCVRL */
+     case 78: /* XMTRL */
++        val = (val > 0) ? val : 512;
++        break;
+     case 112:
+        if (CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s))
+            break;
+-- 
+2.5.5

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+In virtio gpu resource create dispatch, if the pixman format is zero
+it doesn't free the resource object allocated previously. Thus leading
+a host memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index 7fe6ed8..5b6d17b 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
+                       "%s: host couldn't handle guest format %d\n",
+                       __func__, c2d.format);
++        g_free(res);
+         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+         return;
+     }
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+While processing isochronous transfer descriptors(iTD), if the page
+select(PG) field value is out of bands it will return. In this
+situation the ehci's sg list doesn't be freed thus leading a memory
+leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+index b093db7..f4ece9a 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+@@ -1426,6 +1426,7 @@ static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
+             if (off + len > 4096) {
+                 /* transfer crosses page border */
+                 if (pg == 6) {
++                    qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
+                     return -1;  /* avoid page pg + 1 */
+                 }
+                 ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg + 1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8576.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 20009bdaf95d10bf748fa69b104672d3cfaceddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
+Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 10:15:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] xhci: limit the number of link trbs we are willing to process
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+index 726435c..ee4fa48 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
+  * to the specs when it gets them */
+ #define ER_FULL_HACK
+ 
++#define TRB_LINK_LIMIT  4
++
+ #define LEN_CAP         0x40
+ #define LEN_OPER        (0x400 + 0x10 * MAXPORTS)
+ #define LEN_RUNTIME     ((MAXINTRS + 1) * 0x20)
+@@ -1000,6 +1002,7 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
+                                dma_addr_t *addr)
+ {
+     PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(xhci);
++    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
+ 
+     while (1) {
+         TRBType type;
+@@ -1026,6 +1029,9 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
+             ring->dequeue += TRB_SIZE;
+             return type;
+         } else {
++            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
++                return 0;
++            }
+             ring->dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb->parameter);
+             if (trb->control & TRB_LK_TC) {
+                 ring->ccs = !ring->ccs;
+@@ -1043,6 +1049,7 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
+     bool ccs = ring->ccs;
+     /* hack to bundle together the two/three TDs that make a setup transfer */
+     bool control_td_set = 0;
++    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
+ 
+     while (1) {
+         TRBType type;
+@@ -1058,6 +1065,9 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
+         type = TRB_TYPE(trb);
+ 
+         if (type == TR_LINK) {
++            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
++                return -length;
++            }
+             dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb.parameter);
+             if (trb.control & TRB_LK_TC) {
+                 ccs = !ccs;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8577.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+In 9pfs read dispatch function, it doesn't free two QEMUIOVector
+object thus causing potential memory leak. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 119ee58..543a791 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1826,14 +1826,15 @@ static void v9fs_read(void *opaque)
+             if (len < 0) {
+                 /* IO error return the error */
+                 err = len;
+-                goto out;
++                goto out_free_iovec;
+             }
+         } while (count < max_count && len > 0);
+         err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count);
+         if (err < 0) {
+-            goto out;
++            goto out_free_iovec;
+         }
+         err += offset + count;
++out_free_iovec:
+         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
+         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
+     } else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8578.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From ba42ebb863ab7d40adc79298422ed9596df8f73a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: allocate space for guest originated empty strings
+
+If a guest sends an empty string paramater to any 9P operation, the current
+code unmarshals it into a V9fsString equal to { .size = 0, .data = NULL }.
+
+This is unfortunate because it can cause NULL pointer dereference to happen
+at various locations in the 9pfs code. And we don't want to check str->data
+everywhere we pass it to strcmp() or any other function which expects a
+dereferenceable pointer.
+
+This patch enforces the allocation of genuine C empty strings instead, so
+callers don't have to bother.
+
+Out of all v9fs_iov_vunmarshal() users, only v9fs_xattrwalk() checks if
+the returned string is empty. It now uses v9fs_string_size() since
+name.data cannot be NULL anymore.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+[groug, rewritten title and changelog,
+ fix empty string check in v9fs_xattrwalk()]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+---
+ fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c | 2 +-
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c           | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
+index 663cad5..1d16f8d 100644
+--- a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
++++ b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ssize_t v9fs_iov_vunmarshal(struct iovec *out_sg, int out_num, size_t offset,
+                 str->data = g_malloc(str->size + 1);
+                 copied = v9fs_unpack(str->data, out_sg, out_num, offset,
+                                      str->size);
+-                if (copied > 0) {
++                if (copied >= 0) {
+                     str->data[str->size] = 0;
+                 } else {
+                     v9fs_string_free(str);
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 119ee58..39a7e1d 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3174,7 +3174,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
+         goto out;
+     }
+     v9fs_path_copy(&xattr_fidp->path, &file_fidp->path);
+-    if (name.data == NULL) {
++    if (!v9fs_string_size(&name)) {
+         /*
+          * listxattr request. Get the size first
+          */
+-- 
+2.7.3
+

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8668.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+Rocker network switch emulator has test registers to help debug
+DMA operations. While testing host DMA access, a buffer address
+is written to register 'TEST_DMA_ADDR' and its size is written to
+register 'TEST_DMA_SIZE'. When performing TEST_DMA_CTRL_INVERT
+test, if DMA buffer size was greater than 'INT_MAX', it leads to
+an invalid buffer access. Limit the DMA buffer size to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/net/rocker/rocker.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
+index 30f2ce4..e9d215a 100644
+--- a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
++++ b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
+@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ static void rocker_io_writel(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val)
+         rocker_msix_irq(r, val);
+         break;
+     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_SIZE:
+-        r->test_dma_size = val;
++        r->test_dma_size = val & 0xFFFF;
+         break;
+     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_ADDR + 4:
+         r->test_dma_addr = ((uint64_t)val) << 32 | r->lower32;
+-- 
+2.5.5

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+The JAZZ RC4030 chipset emulator has a periodic timer and
+associated interval reload register. The reload value is used
+as divider when computing timer's next tick value. If reload
+value is large, it could lead to divide by zero error. Limit
+the interval reload value to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/dma/rc4030.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/dma/rc4030.c b/hw/dma/rc4030.c
+index 2f2576f..c1b4997 100644
+--- a/hw/dma/rc4030.c
++++ b/hw/dma/rc4030.c
+@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static void rc4030_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t data,
+         break;
+     /* Interval timer reload */
+     case 0x0228:
+-        s->itr = val;
++        s->itr = val & 0x01FF;
+         qemu_irq_lower(s->timer_irq);
+         set_next_tick(s);
+         break;
+-- 
+2.5.5

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
+(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
+be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
+greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
+divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/char/serial.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Update per
+  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-10/msg02400.html
+
+diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
+index 3442f47..eec72b7 100644
+--- a/hw/char/serial.c
++++ b/hw/char/serial.c
+@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
+     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
+     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
+ 
+-    if (s->divider == 0)
++    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
+         return;
++    }
+ 
+     /* Start bit. */
+     frame_size = 1;
+-- 
+2.5.5

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8909.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+Intel HDA emulator uses stream of buffers during DMA data
+transfers. Each entry has buffer length and buffer pointer
+position, which are used to derive bytes to 'copy'. If this
+length and buffer pointer were to be same, 'copy' could be
+set to zero(0), leading to an infinite loop. Add check to
+avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/audio/intel-hda.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
+index cd95340..537face 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
++++ b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
+@@ -416,7 +416,8 @@ static bool intel_hda_xfer(HDACodecDevice *dev, uint32_t stnr, bool output,
+     }
+ 
+     left = len;
+-    while (left > 0) {
++    s = st->bentries;
++    while (left > 0 && s-- > 0) {
+         copy = left;
+         if (copy > st->bsize - st->lpib)
+             copy = st->bsize - st->lpib;
+-- 
+2.7.4

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8910.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+RTL8139 ethernet controller in C+ mode supports multiple
+descriptor rings, each with maximum of 64 descriptors. While
+processing transmit descriptor ring in 'rtl8139_cplus_transmit',
+it does not limit the descriptor count and runs forever. Add
+check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Andrew Henderson <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+index 3345bc6..f05e59c 100644
+--- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
++++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static void rtl8139_cplus_transmit(RTL8139State *s)
+ {
+     int txcount = 0;
+ 
+-    while (rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
++    while (txcount < 64 && rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
+     {
+         ++txcount;
+     }
+-- 
+2.7.4

app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-binfmt.initd-r1

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/sbin/openrc-run
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
+# Copyright 1999-2016 Gentoo Foundation
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 # $Id$
 
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ start() {
       echo   ':sparc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc:'"${QEMU_BINFMT_FLAGS}" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
    fi
    if [ $cpu != "ppc" -a -x "/usr/bin/qemu-ppc" ] ; then
-      echo   ':ppc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x14:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc:'"${QEMU_BINFMT_FLAGS}" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
+      echo   ':ppc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x14:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc:'"${QEMU_BINFMT_FLAGS}" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
    fi
    if [ $cpu != "m68k" -a -x "/usr/bin/qemu-m68k" ] ; then
       #echo   'Please check cpu value and header information for m68k!'

app-emulation/qemu/qemu-2.7.0-r5.ebuild

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ PYTHON_REQ_USE="ncurses,readline"
 PLOCALES="bg de_DE fr_FR hu it tr zh_CN"
 
 inherit eutils flag-o-matic linux-info toolchain-funcs multilib python-r1 \
-	user udev fcaps readme.gentoo pax-utils l10n
+	user udev fcaps readme.gentoo-r1 pax-utils l10n
 
 if [[ ${PV} = *9999* ]]; then
 	EGIT_REPO_URI="git://git.qemu.org/qemu.git"
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ SOFTMMU_LIB_DEPEND="${COMMON_LIB_DEPEND}
 		virtual/opengl
 		media-libs/libepoxy[static-libs(+)]
 		media-libs/mesa[static-libs(+)]
-		media-libs/mesa[egl,gles2]
+		media-libs/mesa[egl,gles2,gbm]
 	)
 	png? ( media-libs/libpng:0=[static-libs(+)] )
 	pulseaudio? ( media-sound/pulseaudio )
@@ -282,8 +282,6 @@ pkg_setup() {
 	enewgroup kvm 78
 }
 
-#S="${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}"
-
 # Sanity check to make sure target lists are kept up-to-date.
 check_targets() {
 	local var=$1 mak=$2
@@ -338,12 +336,30 @@ src_prepare() {
 
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.5.0-cflags.patch
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.5.0-sysmacros.patch
+
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-6836.patch   # bug 591242
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7155.patch   # bug 593034
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7156.patch   # bug 593036
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7157-1.patch # bug 593038
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7157-2.patch # bug 593038
 	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7170.patch   # bug 593284
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7421.patch   # bug 593950
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7422.patch   # bug 593956
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7423.patch   # bug 594368
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7466.patch   # bug 594520
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7907.patch   # bug 596048
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7908.patch   # bug 596049
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7909.patch   # bug 596048
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7994-1.patch # bug 596738
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-7994-2.patch # bug 596738
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8576.patch   # bug 596752
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8577.patch   # bug 596776
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8578.patch   # bug 596774
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8668.patch   # bug 597110
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8669-1.patch # bug 597108
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8669-2.patch # bug 597108
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8909.patch   # bug 598044
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2016-8910.patch   # bug 598046
 
 	# Fix ld and objcopy being called directly
 	tc-export AR LD OBJCOPY